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Introduction
    RIA (Regulatory Impact Analysis) is an important tool to improve regulatory 
quality and to reduce unnecessary or out of date regulations. We can cite the best 
practices from the OECD paper and AEI approach proposed by K J. Arrow and so on. 
However, we know that any kind of RIA has several problems in assessing or calculating 
the benefits and costs of regulatory policy. They relate to the problem of quantitative 
measures concerning benefits and costs which might not be solved in a near future. 
    I think that we need to collect a number of methodologies or RIAs and to learn 
from successful experiences in this process. Although the RIA research of the OECD 
focused on frameworks of RIA and its resulting effects through collecting the 
questionnaire from member countries, they do not study so much the methodology and 
contents of RIA. However, the quality of RIA is very important to be used as a policy
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 tool. Policy Cost Analysis in Japan is not related to RIA directly. But I think that it 
presents some relevant or interesting issues involving assessment or evaluation ofRIA. 
 1. Background 
     Total government deficit in Japan increased to70 trillion Yen by the end of 2002. 
The deficit continued to increase in the 1990s because the government expanded the 
fiscal policy in order to revitalize the stalled economy. Though a fiscal policy has three 
functions - (1) to allocate resources, (2) to redistribute income, (3) to adjust he economy 
or preserve conomic stability, - the government used it as a means to develop the 
national economy in a Keynesian style. In this decade, which is called 'the lost 10 years', 
a 'go and stop' macro-economic policy was repeated in turn by strengthening public 
investment and squeezing fiscal policy. At the 'go' stage, the government repeated the 
ineffective fiscal policy, despite the decline of multiplier effect of public investments, and 
resulted in increasing the deficit o a large xtent. One of the reasons why fiscal policies 
did not bring so good effects on the national economy is that Japan's ociety changed 
rapidly to a post-industrial society, which required new social infrastructures unlike those 
of the existing industrial society. Nevertheless, fi cal policy failed to shift its target areas 
and couldn't respond appropriately to the changing conditions of economic and social 
infrastructures. 
    The Fiscal Investment and Loans Programme (FILP) is a part of government fiscal 
activities. The FLIP has supplied long-term loans based on the diet decision in order to 
achieve a certain policy goal. These fiscal activities based on the FLIP have been 
promoted by onerous funds or by a combination of onerous funds, and non-
compensation funds. Even in the former case, if the government intends to reduce the 
burden of users, non-compensation fu ds may be required. The FLIP has aimed to assist 
fiscal policy through public funds. Traditionally, Japan's fiscal activities have rather 
depended on the FILP. The FILP provided long-term, fixed, and low-interest financing 
that the private financial institutions cannot provide. In doing so, the FILP fulfilled the 
resource allocation functions in areas where some burdens should be asked of 
beneficiaries or in areas where private sector financing should be supplemented. The 
FILP allocated resources through (1) operating agencies such as the Japan Highway 
Public Corporation, and (2) financial institutions uch as the Development Bank of 
Japan. The FILP also played a role in discretionary counter-cyclical djustments. 
Whenever the government enacted a series of macro-economic policy such as the 
"Comprehensive Economic Package (1998)", the "Emergency Economic Package 
(1999)", and the Economic Regeneration Program (2000)", additional fund allocations
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to FILP were made as part of these packages. Surprisingly, whenever authorized todo so, 
FILP agencies were allowed to increase the amount of their planned loans up to 50% 
during the year in order to meet unforeseen changes. 
    The FILP is not funded with tax money. It pays interest on all the funds it takes in. 
The Fiscal Loan Fund (FLT, the successor is the Trust Fund Bureau, TFB) has managed 
these funds to achieve various objectives. Its primary sources have been the Postal Savings 
and the Employee and National Pension Reserves. The FILP is different from general 
fiscal investment in the sense that it has been a unique financial mechanism that 
incorporates interest-bearing funds in fiscal policy to effectively implement public policy. 
In other words, it might reduce policy costs through using the financial techniques of
lending, recovering funds with interest. In addition, it does not depend upon tax 
revenues directly for repayment of its bonds. The amount of FILP increased in the 
1990s, whenever the government s rengthened fiscal policies to revitalize the Japanese 
economy. So. when failures of a series of fiscal policies became apparent, naturally the 
FLIP was questioned as to whether it only contributed to spend waste public 
investments. 
    Facing the rapid accumulated government deficits, the FILP was severely criticized 
as a waste mechanism to be reviewed basically.' There were, however, two functions that 
the FLIP undertook implicitly(=financing and fiscal investment). The Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) emphasized that concerning the former function it worked well under 
the Asset-Liability-Management system (ALM). The MOP insisted that the core role of 
the FILP financing tied in the ALM, which ensured that the FLIP transfers short-term 
funds (mainly 10 year postal savings) to the super long-term funds (mainly long-term 
loans to the FILP agencies) vice-versa (mainly national bond) as well as adjusted time 
lags between the ongoing issuance ofFILP bonds and loan disbursement bywatching the 
yield curves. Through such arguments that the FLIP should undertake the financial field 
of policy and long-term finance, the raison d'@tre of FLIP was firmly confirmed in the 
financial aspect of the fiscal policy. 
    At the time interest rates were regulated, they formed a normal yield curve whereby 
long-term finance rates were higher than short-term finance rates. However, after the 
liberalization f the finance sector, interest rates changed drastically, which might cause 
an adverse yield curve, This situation required the FILP to prepare a risk management 
strategy to tackle the various risks. The ALM was successful in the 1990s and enabled a
stable balance of the FILP Special Account. On the other hand, even if the swap market 
is prepared, financial institutions in the private sector have difficulties in supplying large
39
amounts of long-term loans, especially in a case when an adverse yield curve can occur. 
However, the FLF can supply them, using its advantages. That is, it can encompass high 
government guarantees, combine multiple financial resources, and operate with them 
during the various periods. In any country, the government has to commit in long-term 
financing. The FLIP could function well without postal savings by issuing the bonds by 
itself. 
    FILP reforms tarted in 1999, and have proceeded since based on the "Bill for the 
Amendment tothe Trust Fund Bureau Fund Act and Others (ATFBFAO)" which aims 
at better suiting the FILP to changing social and economic onditions. In this process, 
the finance aspect of FLIP was separated from fiscal investment problems. After that, 
FILP reforms focused on the aspect of the inefficient management of FILP agencies such 
as public corporations. 
    FILP reforms have been also promoted from the viewpoint of the Administrative 
Reform Guidelines approved by the Cabinet on 1 December 2000, which set three 
directions for the FILP: (1) reduction and prioritization of the FILP, (2) expansion of 
FILP agencies i suing bonds, (3) enhancement and publication of policy cost analysis 
(PCA). The guidelines directed to restructure a host of public corporations a well as to 
review the FILP: (1) means that the FILP should be reduced and target areas prioritized 
in light of complementation of the private sector, certainty of repayment and results of 
PCA. (2) relates to the government intension that each public corporation should be 
evaluated in the financial market through issuing bonds. This finance system was 
expected to enhance the incentives of public corporation for more efficient operations 
and management, resulting in a higher performance. And (3) was expected to support 
these reform by improving disclosure offuture public burdens.
2 Reform of the FILP system
1. The FLIP was criticized with regards to the four following points: (1) the FLIP is a 
mechanism to collect funds nationwide and allot them to the specific areas like a planned 
economy of socialism, (2) the government must spend all the funds it collects, which 
leads to unnecessary FILP loans and investments, (3) according to the investigation of
the Accounting Inspection Commission, many agencies have non-performing bonds 
which can not be recovered, (4) Postal Savings should be regarded as a unique financial 
commodity neglecting market principles that cannot exist in the private sector. MOF 
argued against these critical opinions.
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    The framework of the FILP's reform is summarized in the two following basic 
concepts: (a) Harmonization of the FILP with market principles and (b) Reform of the 
FILP agencies. According to(a), the FILP system was fundamentally changed from a 
scheme with compulsory deposit of postal savings and pension reserves into a fund-
raising scheme toraise in the financial markets only the amount of funds required by 
FILP agency projects. Review of the FILP's target areas by restricting the FILP to 
complementary areas with the private sectors was expected to ensure them to obtain 
future financial soundness or repayment. 
Reform outlines are as follows 
    1. Fund Raising: 
      a) Elimination f the compulsory deposit ofpostal savings and pension reserves. 
         Compulsory deposits was abolished in 2001, and the Postal Life Insurance 
         Reserves ceased tobe loaned to the FILP agencies. Fundamentally, they are 
         now invested in the financial market. However, parts of them lend money to 
        local governments with financial difficulties within the limits established by 
         the Local Government Bond Plan and the FILP Plan. These loans are 
         disbursed based on uniform government conditions in a commiment 
         approved bythe Diet as a part of the national budget. They account for a 
        large amount of public funds collected by the government and are now 
        subject tostrict rules in their portfolio investment. 
     b) FILP Agency Bonds. These bonds were introduced to enhance a market-
         oriented incentive toimprove the operation f agencies. Each agency has to 
         seek its own fund-raising opportunity and make an effort to issue the bond 
        in its favor by obtaining high market evaluation.2 
     c) Government-Guaranteed Bonds.These bonds may be issued only in limited 
        cases by institutions through rigorous screening. This is the case of the FILP 
        agency being unable to issue bonds immediately without government 
         guarantee. 
     d) FILP Bonds. Funds raised collectively by the government through the 
        issuance of FILP bonds in the market can be allocated to agencies 
        implementing required projects which need very long-term financing. FLIP 
        Bonds are expected to complement (b) or (c). FILP bonds are to be issued in 
         the new special account separated from the general account due to its 
        different redemption scheme. FILP bonds have to be approved bythe Diet
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          to maintain fiscal discipline, too. Moreover, FILP bonds are to be treated 
        equally to the Japan Government Bonds (jGB) in the primary and secondary 
          market following JGB's current procedures and local government bond 
         issuance. That is, the issuing period of FLIP bonds i  to be diversified in line 
        with those of JGB. 
    2. Review of the FILP target areas and projects. In order to avoid the bloating ofthe 
      FILP's target areas, projects are reviewed under the principles of 
      complementarily with the private s ctor and future financial soundness. 
     3. Harmonization with market principles. The following measures are implemented 
      in order to adjust the FILP to market principles. (a) The additional r te on the 
      ELF deposits taking consideration f r depositors' management is eliminated. (b)
      The loan rate changes according to the maturity of the loan based on the 
     prevailing yield curve of JGB in the market. (c) ALM function is enhanced to 
      control the FILP system. (d)Financing bills are issued in order to smoothly adjust 
      time lags between the ongoing issuance of FILP bonds and loan disbursement. 
    4. Diet approval. The reformed FILP's plan is approved bythe Diet as a part of the 
      national budget since the FILP is defined as long-term financing with resource 
      allocation functions for the sake of fiscal policy implementation. The FILP 
      which consists in investments, loans, and guarantees is submitted to the Diet to 
      facilitate discussion. At that ime, the planned amount of FILP, agency bonds 
      and total amount ofloans to local governments have to be attached as references. 
    These reforms based on the Amendment took effect in April 2001 in parallel with 
implementing the Fundamental L w on the Reform of Government Ministries and 
Agencies. These reforms have given the Postal Savings and the Employee and National 
Pension Reserves broad autonomy over their fund management. As aresult, he FILP 
now mainly raises funds from the financial markets by issuing FILP bonds. The FILP 
bonds truly required by FILP agencies to carry out their projects have been issued under 
market-linked interest-rate conditions. The interest rate for loans has been set according
2. As for the FLIP agency bonds, there was a criticism that the market couldn't 
correctly judge such bonds since it could only estimate their profitability. That is, the 
social significance of issuing bonds and their resulting effect could be evaluated only at 
the political evel. However, This is an extreme argument. I think that the FLIP agency 
bonds hould still be evaluated inthe financial market not so as to lead the wrong actions 
of FLIP agencies.
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to the maturity of the loan, based on the prevailing yield curve of JGB in the market. 
    Fiscal activities of the government are financed by tax revenues and FILP bonds. 
Using tax revenues, FILP bonds, or a set of combination of the two depends on the 
nature and goals of public policy. There are some areas where it is appropriate oemploy 
interest-bearing funds rather than tax revenues in order to realize certain policy 
objectives. Areas suited to the FILP financing consist in four categories; (1) Areas in 
which the beneficiary should bear some burden such as toll roads. If the beneficiary can 
be designated, the most efficient allocation would require the beneficiary tobear a certain 
burden. (2) Areas in which self-discipline should be expected. Financial assistance for the 
small and medium-sized businesses through low-interest loans gives a greater incentive 
for self-discipline rather than simply grant subsidies. (3) Areas in which market failures 
may occur. When externalities are great, desirable enterprises might not be emerged since 
financing would be insufficient if left to private financial institutions as shown in 
environmental policy financing for better ecycling project. (4) Areas in which private 
businesses should be encouraged andd assisted. Thus, area targets are focused on small and 
medium sized businesses, roads, railways and subways, airports, water and sewerage, 
education, medical care and social welfare, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry 
and technological development, and international co-operation. For those areas, the 
FILP funds can be efficient and effective. For example, although the national-wide road 
system consists of general roads and highways, the latter are desirable to be constructed 
with the FILP funds compared tothe former. Because the costs of constructing highways 
can be repaid from collected tolls. 
    Following these reforms, the FILP financial agencies begin to examine individual 
projects based on profitability. Through flexible operations, these fforts have restricted 
the amount of FILP activities. The FILP has reduced policy cost in terms of the tax 
burden on the public. The FILP target areas and projects have been also subject o 
continual check whether they are pursued in a financially sound way. At the same time, 
the Postal savings and Pension reserves have been switched to discretionary investment 
which is subject o strict rules about safety and efficiency. Under this new mechanism, 
each agency has been required to raise funds in the financial market. Putting the FILP 
agencies under the judgement of the market has provided incentive for greater efficiency 
in their operations. However, there are some areas where the agency bond issues are not 
enough to fulfill their funding needs. Such projects have to receive loans through FILP 
bonds if they are necessary. In that case, the concerned agency has to reply the following 
questions; (1) whether projects are actually necessary, (2) whether projects are justifiable
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in terms of PCA, and (3) whether repayment of a loan is certain. As mensioned above, 
the issuing and secondary trading mechanism ofFILP bonds have functioned in much 
the same way for JGB. In addition, government guarantee has been provided for some 
FILP agencies that are unable to issue their funds immediately through individual 
screening. 
    The FILP funding sources are summarized in the following three categories (Figure 
1); (1) Fiscal Loans: the primary source of funding has shifted from the Postal Saving 
Funds and Pension Reserves tothe Fiscal Loan Fund (FLF) through raising FILP bond 
issues. However, the Postal Saving Funds, Pension Reserves and Postal Life Insurance 
Reserves are still allowed to make direct loans to fiscally weak local governments within 
the ceiling set by the Local Loan Program. (2) Industrial Investment: the financing 
source of the Industrial Investment Special Account is composed of dividends from the 
NTT and JT, and payment of a decided portion of profits by the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation. (3) Government Guarantee: in some cases, the government 
has to guarantee onthe FILP agencies' bonds in order to facilitate fund-raising. Needless 
to say, the funding source comes from public funds as well as interest-bearing funds. So, 
the law mandates that public funds should be managed in safe, dependable and 
advantageous way. The recipients ofFILP financing are limited to the government (the 
General and Special Accounts), local governments, government-affiliated agencies and 
other public corporations that are legally supervised by the government.
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Figure 1: FILP mechanism (FY 2001
Fiscal Loans
28] trillion yen
Fiscal mans Fund
26.1 trillion yen
Postal Savings Fund
1.0 trillion yen
Postal Life Insurance reserves
1 B trillion yen
Industrial Investment
0.1 trillion yen
Government Guarantee
FILP plan)
          3] trillion yen ( I '"°' °'"' 
Note: Postal saving funds and Postal Insuansu reserves make , as exceptions, direct loans to local gov-
ernments, with the calling specified by the Local Loan Program and the FLIP Plan. source: Financial 
Bureau, "PLP Report 2001"
    After reform, interest rates of the FILP have been changed to those based on 
market principles. The deposit rate paid by the Fiscal Loan Fund is based on the yield for 
JGB, adjusted for the maturity of their deposits. Interest rates charged on financing to 
the FILP agencies are also determined in principle by the market interest rate (secondary 
market yield) for JGB, adjusted for the maturity of financing (different periods) and 
different forms of redemption. The FILP agencies that undertake business operations u e 
FILP financing directly for their businesses. At that time, lending rates of the FILP 
financial institutions are decided on the basis of those of FILP financing and adjusted for 
the terms of the loans. The FILP financial institutions sometimes offer subsidized loans 
at very low-interest rates because the FILP agencies needs to reduce the raising costs to
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promote stable operations oftheir projects. In these cases, pecial budgetary measures are 
provided to the FILP agencies. 
    Reform of the FILP system has initially aimed at cutting the amount of inefficient 
activities of FILP agencies through arranging the duplication of FILP financing and 
restructuring the existing system. However, such a tide focused on reviewing amount of 
activities has changed subtly when the Koizumi government emerged. The prime 
minister Koizumi has promoted the FILP reform more radically by emphasizing on 
privatisation of three major activities of Post Office (Postal services, Postal Savings, and 
Postal Life Insurance Reserves). After that, the policy focus has shifted from reduction of 
the FILP activities to reform of agencies' organizations. The government believes that as 
long as the FILP agencies would continue to do their activities and maintain the status 
quo, it is impossible to solve the bad debts problems. Almost public corporations are 
now to be abolished, integrated, or privatised. The Koizumi reform policy is expressed by
the phrase that government should concede its activities which the private sector can do 
to the private sector. This is because the postal reform has been grasped as a key to 
correct the wastful FLIP mechanism such as the Japan Highway Corporation.
3. Framework of PCA
    The Policy Cost Analysis (PCA) was introduced in 1999 in the process of reform 
as a useful tool to improve fficiency of FILP financial institutions and agencies. The 
government required the Fiscal Ministry to reduce the amount and to slime down the 
scale of activities through making a new set of FLIP principles concerning complement 
of the private sector, certainty of redemption, and implementation of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
    PCA was introduced after the fashion of the Federal Credit Program (FCP) of the 
OMB in the U.S. The Federal Credit Reform Act, which was enforced in 1992, has 
directed to estimate future costs of individual projects in the PCP and to release their 
subsidy costs by the budgetary paper of the first fiscal year of their enforcement. The
3. According to a model calculation of FCP, in a case of government guarantee, all
cash flows relates to that loan project. Cash- inflow (=commission, withdrawal of bad 
debt) and cash-outflow (=default) are estimated in terms of the present value. However, 
calculating the subsidy rate of individual projects requires in advance various 
assumptions such as discount rate, interest rate of loan, and so on.
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Subsidy Cost (SC) is defined in terms of the net present value of cash-flow (=a difference 
between outflow and inflow), and the zero coupon bond issued by the Fiscal Ministry 
has been applied to calculate as a proper discount rate3. Although the SC analysis has 
some difficulties in implementing ( ex. determining an appropriate discount rate, 
estimating future default rates or probability of pre-maturity redemption and so on), the 
OMB has improved the SC scheme through trial and error, Now the subsidy rate (=net 
present value/permission value of loan with government guarantee) becomes an effective 
measure toevaluate individual projects. 
    However, the FLIP is different from the PCP in some points. The major part of 
FLIP consists of direct finance compared to that of FCP, where subsidy is used to give 
mainly credit supplement. In addition, there is an institutional difference. In the 
framework of FILP in Japan, the cost of credit supplement, subscription as well as 
subsidy has to be calculated as policy cost because they all can be seen as government 
burdens. In this respect, PCA has to contain a ` stock' concept in its calculation. Thus, 
PCA treats (1) subsidy (from General Accounting and so on), (2) opportunity cost of 
subscription or zero-interest loan, and (3) payment to the treasury such as a dividend, 
corporation tax, and so on. The amount of policy cost is calculated as (1) + (2) - (3). 
PCA aims at quantitatively capturing the usage cost of subsidy or subscription that will 
be invested uring analytical period. The interest rate, scale of activity, and expected 
amount of usage are assumed eliberately (=first stage), and cash flow of the project is 
estimated based on such prerequisite conditions (=second stage), and finally total usage 
cost is to be calculated. 
    The policy cost in Japan is also measured in quantitative terms. All costs and 
revenues are conversed into the present values. As for (2), opportunity cost of 
subscription or zero-interest loan is converted into the present value based on the 
assumption that it will be withdrawn until the last fiscal year. When reserve or surplus 
will be generated uring analytical period, it will be added as an increment to the 
principal, adversely when a deficit will be generated, it will be added as a decrement to
the principal (= minus reserves). It is noted that the policy cost refers to usage cost of 
subsidy etc., which will be invested to the FLIP institutions and agencies by the 
government. In short, the concept of policy cost has to be distinguished clearly from that 
of administrative cost based on a single fiscal year. 
    A simplest case of PCA is as follows; For example, we assume that the government 
decides to increase the loans of FILP financial institutions 100 million yen in order to 
boost the businesses. Credit-supplement of his incremental loan is assumed to be 1%,
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that is, 1 million 
supplement until 
policy cost of this
yen each year. In this case, the government is required to pay to credit-
the end of redemption period, 15years. So, if the discount rate is r, the 
credit supplement is expressed by
100/(1+r)+100/(1+r)2+.. .+100/(1+r)15 unit: 10,000yen
    According to this formulation, if the discount rate is 5%, policy cost is 
yen, if 3%, then 12.3 million yen.
10.9 million
     Of course, implementing estimation of PCA is more complex. In calculating the 
 net present value, we should consider some items which are related to future cash-flow. 
 For example, in a case of direct finance (=loan), we should take consideration of default, 
 pre-maturity redemption, surcharge, commission, and withdrawal from non-performing 
 bond. Furthermore, in a case of credit supplement, we should consider additional 
payment accompanied by default, additional credit supplement o lenders, and so on. In 
anticipating the revenues and costs derived from the FLIP activities, PCA has to make an 
estimation based on a set of assumptions. They are divided into two large categories; one 
is common assumptions, the other is individual ones. The former mainly relates to a 
future interest rate of FLIP financing and a discount rate, which should be set in advance 
based on the actual yield trend of government bond in the market. The latter relates to a 
rate of moving-up redemption, a rate of bad debt, and revenues in the future, which 
should be estimated by each FLIP financial institution and agency. While the former 
assumptions are derived from econometric model, taking consideration of actual results 
of the FLIP financial institutions, the latter are derived from demand prospect or amount 
of usage estimated by the concerned FLIP agency based on the past data. 
    The required policy cost varies according to the operation of fund-management. Its 
cost is the highest when redemption of the FLIP loans could be covered by tax, while it is 
zero when they could be redeemed through beneficiary payment without tax. Then, the 
bond of local government is most expensive among FILP financing. Policy cost is 
decreasing as a rate of beneficiary payment to redemption resources becomes larger. 
Inversely, it is increasing as a rate of subsidy to redemption resources is rising higher. As 
mentioned above, non-compensation loan (=subsidy, subscription) and zero-interest loan 
are assumed to generate opporruniry costs because they could have brought some gain if 
such expenditures can be avoided (e.g. spending JGB). Even if they will be redeemed 
after a certain period, some policy cost will arise in terms of the present value.
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    In summary, we can define PCA as a quantitative analysis to capture the usage cost 
of subsidy, subscription, credit supplement which will be invested to the FLIP activities 
until the endd of analytical period. PCA is enacted in accordance with the following 
procedure. Firstly, the concerned institution or agency isto make a prospect of its project 
based on common and individual assumptions. Secondly, it is to estimate all cash flows 
during analytical period based on the business foresight. Thirdly, the TFB is to make a 
trial calculation of the amount of subsidies and so on which will be invested from the 
government over year based on the expected cash-flow, presupposing the framework of 
the FLIP to be unchanged. And finally the TFB is to estimate policy cost through 
dividing the expected subsidies over year by the discount rate corresponding tothe 
relevant fiscal year."
    The results have been published in order to draw people's interest and prompt o 
review the FILP areas and projects trictly. PCA has covered 33 of the FILP financial 
institutions and agencies, which have received fiscal loan and government guarantee 
more or less through the FLIP system.
4. Results of PCA and Remaining Problems
   PCA has been published since 2000. The main results of PCA as of 2001 are as 
follows (Table 1, Figure 2):
4. The concrete procedure of estimating policy cost is to be made through the 
following calculations: (1) Estimation of subsidy, grant and so on: About subsidy or the 
like, the amount of investment over year is converted into the present value, and the 
expected amount over year is to be aggregated. (2) Estimation of subscription, low-
interest loan or zero-interest loan and so on: In a case of low-interest loan, it is assumed 
to be redeemed to the public purse until the end of analytical period. Next, it is 
calculated as an opportunity cost since such a loan could have brought some gain to the 
government if it had been spent in another way. Thirdly, since such a loan has the same 
effect upon the national economy, it is also converted into the present value. (3) 
Estimation of payment to government: Since payment or dividend is a transfer of money 
to the government, it is regarded as a minus-subsidy. It is also converted into the present 
value.
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Table 1: FY 2001
Category
Policy Coast Analysis (list of costs broken down by institutions) 
                         (unit: billion yen)
Institution  Policy cost Analysis 
(billion yen) I period (years;
Government Financial Institutions
LThe Goverment Housing Lo
an Corporation -154 32
National Lifa finance Corporation43.6 31
Japa
Finance Corparation,for
The
JapanSmall Business 88.7 21
Fisheries Finance Corporationriculture,Forosty and 499.0 57
n Finance,MunicipalCorporation forEnterprises 9.3 30
37Oklnawa Development Finance Corporation 5.0
i
~evelopment Bank cf Japan 128.2 31
International CooperationJapan Bank for 723.1
88,qAccount forlnternatlonal Fi ncial Operations _J 27
Economic[Account for OverseasCooperation Operations . 6342 40
Other semi-government Bodies
I
4
F
Urban Development Corporation 1,234.2 80
Government Pension Investment Fund 325.7 36
Talon
Japan Envlroment Corporation
Ipd Transmit Authority _
Japan RegionaLDevelopment Corporation
Account for R gional City Development Project
36.5 24
10.7 38
87
16.77333..
25.7 22
36.3 28
74.7 29
I
i
Account for Industrial Reallocm on, etc. Project
Account for Coal Re ig on Promotion Project
Japan Sewape Works Agency_
Social Welfare and Medical Service Corporation E9.E
25_I64 9General Account
Account
PromotionAid Corpora
6 _
21
for Pension-secured Loan - 47
Theand Mutualton for Private
School f.lanan 49
Japan Scholarship Foundation 104.9 26
Japan Green Resources Corporation _ _ 1,374.3I
i
Main Forestry Road Construction 4-- _7_20.3 _
1,014.2
37
BeWater Source Forest Cultivation
I
Integrated Agricultural Land Improvement Project 139.8 25
Japan Highway Public Corporation 3,461.5 
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation 371,2 ! 36
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation 270.0 46
Honshu Shikoku Bridge Authority 630.6 1 54
Japan Railway Construction Public Corporation 202
New Tokyo International Air Authority -62 .C
Corporation for Advanced Tranceport & Technorogy 3.3
Water Resources Development Public permeation 235.4
Metal Mining Agency of Japan 0.6
Japan National Oil Corporation 1,824.2
3
23
17
37
15
21
21
5
33
Special Corporations
The Snake Creole Bank 53.2
Fail International Airport Cc,, Ltd I 2,2 3
i Central Japan International Airport Co.,Ltd 11.2
* Organization for Promotion Urban Development -1
.3 16
* ITheElectric Power Develo
ment Company, Ltd -152 .3 12
Asterlsk(lindicate instltutlons fir t published FY 2001 
source: !bid 
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    Figure 2: FLIP Funds Trends (unit: billion yen) 
    una,bllllon ye 20,000 25,000 30,000 3,500 40,000 45,000 
I 
     FY 1989 y, 1,207.5 (27,548.0)                                                        ~ .initial ~~ 
                                                              `~`°-q .~, Ootno 
                                                                    Fntlooti~     FY 1990 s.,7T s 1,468.3(29,090.7)L
     FY 1991 , . - ' ~- (31,315.3) 
     FY 1992 x4'.,;ycy;xam (37,067.6) 
                                                              (45,374.2)
    FY 1993 A,* a 
     FY 1994 .:`;x'..*a qg * (43,681.6) 
    FY 1995 (44,174.8) 
    FY 1996 
    FY 1997 .x(27,548.0) 
                                                                    1,578.2 
    FY 1998 (43,O946) 
    FY 1999 (40,762.8) 
                                                             1,413.6 
    FY 2000 JO, S(38,074.7) 
                                                       608.7 
    FY 2001 
      source: Mid 
    In order to examine more detailed PCA, we shall take up a representative FLIP 
financial institution and a representative agency, which are the most expensive among 
them. One is the Japan Highway Public Corporation (3,461.5 billion yen), the other is 
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (723.1 billion yen). Individual PCA 
consists of the following 5 items: That is, (1) Contents of activities,(2)Reasons for 
subsidy and so on, (3) amount or size of the FLIP funds (amount of total analysis 
period), (4)effects and socio-economic benefits, (5)trial estimation ofpolicy cost. Among 
these items, most important i ems are (2) and (4). 
    For example, in a case of the JHPC, (2) is explained as follows; Highway road 
activity in Japan has progressed under a unique financial system. That is, the JHPC 
Corporation has borrowed money from the FLIP in order to cover the cost of
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construction, maintenance, and management, and has redeemed itsprincipal and interest 
by imposing tolls to the users. So, subscription and subsidy from Special account for 
alleviating the interest rate of road network maintenance are needed to reduce the user's 
burden. And (4) is estimated by aggregating flow-effect of creating new demand (about 
43,500 billion yen) and stock effect of benefit for the users (about 11,500 billion yen per 
annual). 
    In a case of JBIC, which is a new integrated financial institution of the Export-
Import Bank and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, (2) is explained as follows; 
the JBIC ACT reguires the Bank management to maintain the break-even point. 
Regrettably, about (5) quantitative analysis of benefits has not still implemented 
sufficiently. However, the old Export-Import Bank estimated benefits of financing for 
Asian countries up to 74.0 billion dollar over the world, including the US and EU. 
    The methods or techniques of PCA have developed gradually since 1999. 
Especially after 2001, the Fiscal Ministry (=former Ministry of Finance) has endeavoured 
to disclose more information about the used assumptions, legal rationale for subsidy, 
subscription, and credit supplement and in parallel with it has introduced a set of 
techniques like "sensitivity analysis" and "comparative analysis over year". 
    The "sensitivity analysis" attempts to calculate policy cost when one of the 
assumptions is changed. Important assumptions that should be considered are future 
interest rates and operational revenues. Simulations focused on such factors would help 
the government to anticipate future costs more accurately. Policy cost may change 
substantially due to a change of such variances. To the extent how much policy cost 
changes depends on the characteristics of individual projects. The major results of these 
analyses are shown in the Table 2.
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
          Institution 
The Government Housing Local Corporation 
National Life Finance Corporation
Standard case 
 (billion yen) 
      -154.9 
       43.6
Urban Development Corporation 1,234.2 Additive
Japan Green Resources Corporation 1,014.2 Operatic
Japan Highway Public Corporation 3,461.5 Operatic
Metroporitan Expressway Public Corporation 371.2 10perato
Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation 270.g
630,6
Operatic
Honshu-shikoku Bridge AuthoroN Operatic
New Tokyo International Airport Go,. Lot -62 .0 Operatic
Kansai International Airport Co,. Ltd 2.2 Operatic
Central Japan International Airport
The Electric Power Development CompanK.Ltd
-11.2
-152.3
Operatioi
Stock sol
source: ibid
 Change in assumption 
Additive_I ntertest +1 % 
Additive intertest +1 % 
itive at +1 % 
onal revenue -10% 
rational revenue-10% 
O rational revenue -10% 
rational revenue-10% 
onal revenue -10% 
onal revenue -10% 
rational revenue -10% 
rational revenue -10%
Increase when 
assumption 
 changed 
 (billion yen) 
    +1,562.4 
       +42.4 
     +654,8 
       +11.6
i-2,809.9 
  +73.8 
  +63.6 
 +176.3 
 +238.2 
 +122.9 
  +42.6
a e price -10% +14.1
1 .  
    The financial statements (=balance sheet and profit / loss statement) in analysing 
the individual cases enable us to compare policy costs over year. The comparative 
analysis was introduced to compare a real change of policy cost over year. There are two 
big problems, however, to compare policy costs over year. One problem relates to the 
procedure that the interest rate should be set differently every ear. In order to solve this 
problem, policy cost of the current fiscal year has to be re-estimated after the interest rate 
of current year is replaced with that of previous year. Please see the case of the National 
Life Finance Corporation (Table3). In this case, the modification is expressed by a 
change of policy cost from 6.6 to 16.0 billion yen. This change means that policy cost is 
reduced by 9.4 billion yen (=16.0-6.6) due to a change of interest rate over year. The 
other problem is that the carrent PCA doesn't reflect policy cost of previous fiscal year 
accurately. Because policy cost of a certain fiscal year only corresponds tothe cost that 
would generate in that year, the procedure to re-estimate he previous cost under the 
current level of interest rate is also required here. That is, policy cost of previous fiscal 
year should be compared tothat of the current fiscal year after the corresponding part of 
previous year's cost is re-estimated through modifying the interest rate. This is expressed 
by a fluctuation of policy cost from 18.2 to 427.4 billion yen. This means that policy 
cosy increases by 43.4 billion yen (=16.0-A27.4) due to a new loan project and some 
change of assumptions such as an increase of uncollectible debts. Through these two 
stage-modifications, PCA can estimate a real fluctuation of political cost over year by
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Table 3! Comparative analysis over year 
ife Finance Corporation hnGdanandredmmiu 
division 2002 20003 char
LOPolicy Cost 
t®2 Policy cost when the interest 
rate is used in the PCA of 
FY2o02
(unit
 03 Policy ost of 2i generated in 
 FY2003 orlater _ 
  Ameans minus 
reflecting new activities. F
compornent analysis appl 
and a breakdown factors is 
deeply. For example, ina ca 
cost (6.6 billion yen:2003) i 
uncollectible d bt portion (1 
    We can evaluate the r 
related expenditures have be, 
implementation f Administ 
to reduce or prioritise the ac 
agency bond, PCA has sur 
unnecessary ctivities of the 
    However, PCA has soi 
important problems. Firstly 
However, the benefit analysi 
in terms of onantitative ana
18,2
: billion yen)
   
,To eliminate 
    change in the 
/ year
 16.0. i.: +43.gi.L.~yr
the influence of a 
interest rate overr
A27.4
;To deduct FY2002 cost from J 
policy cost expected tooccur since 
i FY2003 and later
real policy cost
Recently, related to the comparative study, the principal 
ied to this analysis. The policy cost is analyzed by causative 
estimated in order to understand the factors of change more 
se of National Life Finance corporation, the factors of policy 
s decomposed into pre-maturity redemption portion (75 1), 
e 86.5), and others (=negative spread etc.A255.0). 
effect of implementing PCA positively. In fact, the FLIP-
en decreasing since 1999. Although this may be partly due to 
rative Reform Guidelines, where the government emphasizes 
tivities of FLIP agencies, and to expand issuance of the FLIP 
ely contributed to reduce a scale of activities and cut off 
FLIP financial institutions and agencies. 
me defects that should be overcome. Here we can show two 
, it is important to quantify the benefits of FLIP projects. 
s has not been developed soas to correctly estimate benefits 
qu lysis. PCA depends on the one-sided estimations conducted 
by the concerned institutions or agencies under asymmetry of information. The problem 
is that they incline to over-estimate expected socio-economic effects in order to justify 
their projects. Especially, this is the case of calculations such as demand prospect, future 
revenue, and amount of usage. In an extreme case, the FLIP agencies may false-report so
that the third parties might believe. To some extent, the sensitivity analysis can check 
such behaviour of the FLIP agencies. But, it has not enough check-power to enforce 
them to tell truth. One measure to address this problem is to develop the statistical 
method to quantify the benefits. Another is to create a device of "truth-telling 
mechanism" byimposing penalty or by giving incentives for them to tell the truth. 
    The second problem is related to the nature of PCA. PCA doesn't consider
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alternative to the decided activity. It can only estimate the project that has been already 
decided. In this respect, we should notice the difference b tween PCA and RIA. RIA 
usually takes consideration of alternative policies. 
5. Intersection ofPCA and RIA 
    However, PCA can be seen as a variation of RIA. PCA and RIA are common i
that they use the same concepts of opportunity cost, (net) present value, and social 
discount rate, and concern about government i rusiveness into the private sector. 
However, PCA is different from RIA decisively in that it does not have cost 
identification ssues. White the spending caused by regulation is only part of regulatory 
cost story, it is strictly specified in the PCA. Stated more precisely, while RIA 
encompasses all ffects including adverse effects, PCA only contains the opportunity cost 
of decided finance or subsidy. Moreover, in the case of PCA, the distribution problem 
doesn't occur so seriously. This is due to the difference of natures between fiscal policy 
and regulation. Allpeople can be winners inthe field of fiscal policy. 
    Nevertheless, PCA and RIA have the satiric problems tobe resolved. One problem 
relates tothe benefit analysis. The major problems of the benefit analysis are made up of 
risk analysis and valuing benefits. Risk analysis is closely related tosocial regulation areas 
such as health, safety, and the nature nvironment and also to the FLIP agencies to 
develop natural nd human resources. Compared to this, valuing or quantifying benefits, 
which is known as quantification issues, is more basic problem for cost-benefit analysis. 
Any analyst can rarely quantify all significant impacts and convert them into monetary 
terms. In this respect, the most difficult task is how to place a monetary value on the 
quantified benefits o that it can be compared with costs. Quantified estimates of 
benefits should be made ven if the relevant benefits are not market-priced goods, uch 
as clean air, good drinking water (=related to the Japan Green Resources Corporation, 
the Japan Environmental Corporation), i ternational cooperation (=related to the JPIC), 
medical care (=related to the Social welfare and Medical Service Corporation). As long as 
these activities of the FLIP agencies overlap those of the private sector, we can approach 
to benefit analysis in terms of monetary value. 
    In estimating benefits, he concept of"society's willing to pay for the outcome" is 
very important. Although we need not necessarily exclude non-economic benefit 
components, i  isdesirable to value benefits inorder to compare it with its cost. There 
are two main methods of estimating willingness to pay. The most reliable method isto 
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 use statistical techniques, pecially multiple regression a alysis, tosimulate market 
prices. Multiple regression analysis is used in the study field of job-security, 
environmental amenities. Although these characteristics are often not market-priced, 
shadow price can be inferred from market data. The second method relies on stated 
preferences in contingent value survey. Although this approach has a defect that many 
respondents have little incentive to reveal their true preferences in answers, it is useful to 
get partial information f various benefits. 
    Aside from these approaches, however, additional method will be required in the 
case of PCA because the FLIP activities have often more (positive) xternality impact on 
socio-economic development than regulations addressing market failures. But, analysis of 
externalities, pecially toquantify them and convert into monetary value is very 
difficult. We should evote our efforts to develop new techniques of externality analysis, 
     The other problem relates to the evaluation of future cost. In this respect, 
uncertainty may be a major issue. PCA as well as RIA explicitly accounts for 
uncertainties partially by making use of the sensitivity analysis. However, fundamental 
problem ishow to set an appropriate discount rate as far as the present value is a decisive 
concept. If so, the degree ofcorrectness in calculating future cost depends on a social 
discount rate. How much should society scarify today to generate future socio-economic 
effects? The manner inwhich effects over time are weighted is known as discounting. In 
other words, since benefits hat will arise in the future have lower present value than 
those that arise today, one must discount these impacts oreflect this difference. Here, 
we should notice that what is being discounted is society's willingness to pay for these 
future ffects. In converting alloutcomes into monetary terms, one has to establish a 
metric whereby one can use an appropriate discount rate. Since the relative weight over 
time may be have apivotal effect on the policy choice, this problem isvery important. 
    In practice, how can we set such a proper discount rate? The most popular 
approach is the real rate of return on capital. This is known as DCF formulation r the 
net present value rule in the financial economics. However, it is doubtful whether it can 
directly evaluate the impact of public policy areas. PCA in Japan as well as SC in the US 
has used the treasury discount rate (=typical bond is 10 year bond). This approach seems 
to be suitable for harmonizing with market principles. This method makes the nature of 
public investment with government guarantee clear, separated from the business 
activities ofprivate sector. The government, i stead, has to watch the movement of 
government bond market more strictly to avoid sudden fluctuation f the policy cost. 
    Alternative approach is the Social Time Preference Rate approach adopted by the
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UK. The STPR is defined as the value society attaches topresent consumption, as 
opposed to future consumption. In other words, it is based on comparison f utility 
across different time points. The STPR (=r) is formulated, 
            r=,o+pg 
         p: the rate at which individuals di count future consumption ver present 
consumption. p : the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. g: the annual growth-
in per capita consumption. The STPR is consistent with famous Arrow's principle. 
According tohis principle, costs and benefits are discounted to the present value using a 
range of discount rates chosen to reflect how individuals trade off current consumption 
for future consumption rather than rate of return on private investment. 
    In general, higher discount rates will decrease the value of pay offi so that policies 
with long term benefits relative to costs tend to look less attractive. Use of higher 
discount rate favours policy that is less capital intensive or provides more immediate 
benefit. Contrast to this, use of a lower discount rate will make us more future-oriented 
and more concerned with issues like social infrastructure andnature environment. 
    Both approaches have the same root of their thoughts (= social time preference). 
So it is difficult o judge which approach is superior. However, as for PCA, DCF 
approach is better than STPR approach in the following reasons. Firstly, the STPR is 
difficult o exactly estimate its figures. p and /e are changeable drastically under the 
current uncertain society if they depend on socio-economic cir umstances, S condly, it 
seems tobe far away from the market principles. Although we recognize the significance 
of government guarantee, it can't necessarily educes the degree of uncertainty or risk. 
Thirdly, it is not suitable for public policies related tointernational assists orsupports. 
    However, we can't evaluate the current DCF formulation somuch. It is known 
that a standard concept ofNet Present Value or traditional DCF approach an't adjust 
unexpected changes that would occur in the investment vironment. I  this respect, we 
can evaluate an introduction ofnew techniques such as the sensibility analysis and 
numerical simulations. These are effective to address the problem ofuncertainty to some 
extent. However, they have some limits in estimating uncertainty. For example, the 
sensibility analysis can only treat with a change of one variance atone time. It can't 
address co-relation f variances and a combined ffect of multiple variances upon such a 
fluctuation. Numerical simulations al o can't address this problem appropriately since 
figures calculated from simulation widely depend on the discount rate which should be 
assumed to set forth in advance. 
    The core problem lies in the NPV rule. The problem of this rule is that
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management is assumed not to have amanagerial flexibility ochange an initial decision 
in response to the results. Management o ly commits his investment strategy passively in 
this rule, since the DCF approach originally stands on the principal side (=lender, 
shareholder). In fact, however, any market usually changes uncertainly. In this point, 
managerial flexibility (=postponement, withdrawal, reduction, or enlargement of an 
initial investment project, modification f the scale and scope, abandonment, or sale off 
of facilities) should be considered as afactor to enhance opportunity value of investment 
by limiting the down-side loss or enlarging the up-side profit. The view from real option 
theory is very important when we consider PCA in Japan. Because as privatisation 
scheme has progressed, that is, as the government has allowed management to have more 
discretional power including investment strategy, managers related to the FLIP would be 
required to address positively the problem of uncertainty or risk accompanied by 
investment. If real-option a d the like are allowed to the FLIP activities, real option 
theory approach is useful to make investment more fficient and effective. 
    The NPV rule or traditional DCF formulation can't address uncertainty properly. 
This is known well as a bias in estimating expected cash-flow f investment project under 
uncertainty. The present value is originally derived from time preference urve 
constrained by two opportunity curves (=investment, capital market). It is expressed by, 
    PV=~. rr=~C,l(1+r)' C,: cash-flow f the t period under uncertainty, 
                             r: discount rate 
More generally, 
    PV_ E i=i Cel(1+rt) (1+ ri) ' (1 +rr) 
    A rate of return, which would be obtained from investment opportunity o
comparables, is ordinarily used as a discount rate. However, the present value in 
uncertainty should be modified if there is a systematic risk in the markets. It is known 
that he DCF formulation should be modified into the following, 
    PV= E e=tC,/(1+r)`=F, r 1 a,C,l(1+r)° 
    Cr: cash-flow f equivalent-certainty, a,: coefficient of equivalent-certainty (CES), 
     r: risk free interest ra e 
The above formulation is derived from, 
   PV= E',-iOr/(1+r)`, PVt= C,/(l +r)`= E(Cr)/(1+k)rand C, = a,E(C,) 
    E(C): expected cash-flow, k: interest rate in the market
    If we recognize this modification, what will happen? As CES [ a,=(l+r)/(1+k)] is 
always lower than 1 under uncertainty (O<CES<1), the present value becomes maller
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than the current present value. The effect of this modification on the net present value 
depends on the scale of cost and benefit. Especially concerning policy cost, it would 
decrease if we adopt a new formulation. This may mean that many restrained FLIP 
activities might be revived again. However, we should notice that the yield of national 
bond as a discount rate is presupposed not to be so changeable. If expanding fiscal 
policy, including the FLIP activities, leads to instability of national bond market at the 
same time, a rise of yield accompanied with a decline of price of government bonds 
would require the government o coordinate the gap between the high yield of national 
bond and a lower discount rate set for the FLIP, and to supply additional subsidies to the 
FLIP activities in order to maintain zero or low level of lending rate. If so, the present 
value would increase in spite of introducing a new formulation. Thus, total effects of 
modification are unclear. However, we should consider the problem of uncertainty more 
seriously. In order to maintain the current NPV rule under circumstance of privatisation 
and deregulation, the government at least has to oversee the national bond market more 
earnestly. 
Conclusion 
    To establish RIA system is an emergent problem to promote regulatory reform 
internationally. In this point, RIA is regarded as a kind of international public goods. So, 
we have to enhance the quality of RIA in the process of internationally harmonizing 
frameworks and methods of various RIAs. In order to make regulations more effective 
and efficient, the academics as well as the concerned authorities have to propose more 
robust methodologies, especially with regards to uncertainties or risks. PCA in Japan as a 
variation of RIA contributes toward developing RIA in the context of valuing benefits 
and taking consideration of uncertainty.
5. Here 'risk premium' is defined as follows; P, = d,cov (C„ rm,) =E(C) - Cr. )r: 
market value of risk, rot: expected rate of return in the market, C: cash-flow under 
uncertainty.
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